A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions by Bordi, Francesco & Scolese, Christopher J.
1 
 
IAC-18-D1.5.2 
 
A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions 
 
Francesco Bordia*, The Aerospace Corporation 
Christopher J Scoleseb, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
 
aThe Aerospace Corporation, Civil Systems Group, 2011 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202, USA, 
francesco.bordi@aero.org 
b NASA Goddard Space Flight Center,8800 Greenbelt Road, Greenbelt MD, 20771, USA, 
christopher.j.scolese@nasa.gov 
*Corresponding author 
 
Abstract 
 The NASA risk classification system is meant to guide space mission development from formulation 
through completion of implementation.  It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers 
develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission.  In order to 
be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that 
missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which 
impacts mission schedule and cost.  In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to 
mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before.  Once a project’s risk classification level is 
established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission 
assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be 
reviewed before a new system is proposed. 
 NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing 
levels of risk.  We argue that risk does not change between classes.  What changes are the means available to reduce 
risk.  In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without 
reducing margins.  In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to 
maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both.  We then propose 
a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the 
requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget. 
 Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more 
effective guidance to program and project managers. 
 
1. Introduction: The Problem 
 The NASA risk classification system[1] [2] 
[3] is meant to guide mission payload development 
fro Phase A through completion of Phase C.  It is 
meant to be the basis on which program and project 
managers develop and implement appropriate 
mission assurance and risk management strategies for 
a mission.  In order to be useful, the risk 
classification system needs to provide consistent and 
reproducible classification results so that missions 
may be designed with the appropriate components, 
subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which 
impacts mission schedule and cost.  In our cost-
constrained environment, a clear, robust, and 
reproducible approach to mission implementation for 
fixed cost missions becomes more critical than ever 
before.  Once a project’s risk classification level is 
established, the managers can define the appropriate 
management controls, systems engineering processes, 
mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing 
for that mission. The current NASA mission 
classification system will be reviewed before a new 
system is proposed. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180007026 2019-08-31T18:07:28+00:00Z
2 
 
 
2. Risk Classification System for NASA Payloads 
 The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 
document 8705.4[2] describes the risk classification 
for NASA payloads.  Its purpose is to establish 
baseline criteria that will enable a user to define the 
risk classification level for a NASA payload and the 
design and test philosophy and common assurance 
practices for that level.  Table 1 below describes the 
four risk levels, using criteria such as Agency 
priority.   
 
Characterization Class A Class B  Class C Class D 
Priority (Criticality 
to Agency strategic 
plan) 
High priority High priority Medium priority Low priority 
National 
significance 
Very high High Medium Low to medium 
Complexity Very high to high High to medium Medium to low Medium to low 
Mission lifetime 
(primary baseline 
mission) 
Long, >5 yrs Medium, 2-5 yrs Short, <2 yrs Short, <2 yrs 
Cost High High to medium Medium to low Low 
Launch constraints Critical Medium Few Few to none 
In-flight 
maintenance 
N/A Not feasible or 
difficult 
Maybe feasible Maybe feasible and 
planned 
Alternative research 
opportunities or re-
flight opportunities 
No alternative or re-
flight opportunities 
Few or no 
alternative or re-
flight opportunities 
Some or few 
alternative or re-
flight opportunities 
Significant 
alternative or re-
flight opportunities 
Examples HST, Cassini, 
JIMO, JWST 
MER, MRO, 
Discovery payloads, 
ISS facility-class 
payloads, attached 
ISS payloads 
ESSP, Explorer 
payloads, MIDEX, 
ISS complex 
subrack payloads 
SPARTAN, GAS 
can, technology 
demonstrators, 
simple ISS, express 
middeck and 
subrack payloads, 
SMEX 
Figure 1: Classification Considerations for NASA Class A-D Payloads (NASA Procedural Requirement-NPR 
8705.4 Appendix B) 
 
3.  Issues With The Current Classification System 
 The current system allows engineers, 
scientists, and managers at NASA to argue over 
terminology, implementation plans, and risk postures.  
This lack of consensus is impacting NASA’s ability 
to smoothly develop innovative space-based 
missions.  There are three main issues with the 
current classification system. 
3.1  The current classification system does not 
provide effective guidance to program and project 
managers. 
 Classifying a mission by its criticality to the 
strategic plan, its national significance, and its 
complexity does not inform the actions of the project 
manager and of the project team, for whom the 
mission is the sole priority and focus.   
 Likewise the presence of launch constraints, 
the possibility of in-flight maintenance, and the 
existence of alternative research opportunities do not 
affect the behavior of the project, for which mission 
success is always the objective.   
 Cost (more specifically capped cost), 
schedule constraints, and mission lifetime do 
determine the actions of the project manager and of 
the project team, as we discuss in what follows.  
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3.2  It is difficult to tell the difference between 
classes.  
 Appendix C of NPR 8705.4 [2] lists specific 
project  guidance for class A-D payloads.  The 
difference in guidance between Class B from Class 
C, in particular, is often subtle, and typically not 
observed in practice in the development of flight 
missions. 
 For example, the guidance for Engineering 
Model, Prototype, Flight, and Spare Hardware and  is 
for Reviews is as follows: 
 
 Class B Class C 
Engineering Model, Prototype, 
Flight, and Spare Hardware 
 
Engineering model hardware for 
new or significantly modified 
designs. Protoflight hardware (in 
lieu of separate prototype and flight 
models) except where extensive 
qualification testing is anticipated. 
Spare (or refurbishable prototype) 
hardware as needed to avoid major 
program impact.  
 
Engineering model hardware for 
new designs. Protoflight hardware 
permitted (in lieu of separate 
prototype and flight models). 
Limited flight spare hardware (for 
long lead flight units).  
 
Reviews Full formal review program.Either 
IPAO external independent reviews 
or independent reviews managed at 
the Center level with Mission 
Directorate participation. Include 
formal inspections of software 
requirements, design, verification 
documents, and peer reviews of 
code.  
 
Full formal review program. 
Independent reviews managed at 
Center level with Mission 
Directorate participation. Include 
formal inspections of software 
requirements, peer reviews of 
design and code.  
 
 
Consider for example the flight missions Landsat and 
Plankton Aerosols Clouds and oceans Ecosystems 
(PACE), while both missions are cost capped, with 
similar sized budgets, and both missions are in sun-
synchronous Earth orbit and both carry two 
instruments,  Landsat 9 is Class B, PACE is Class C.   
3.3 The current classification system is based on 
the incorrect assumption that moving from class A to 
class D means taking increasing risk. 
 The classification system is based on risk 
increasing with the decreasing importance of the 
mission.  Once the mission is assigned and the 
project is formed, however, that mission becomes the 
highest priority for the project manager (whether or 
                                                           
c "Once they are on the pad, every mission becomes 
Class A" (Earl Huckins, SMD DAA  FY2000) 
not it is of great national importance).  Also, naturally 
no project manager will deliberately increase the 
mission risk to match the mission classification.   
 We posit that risk does not increase moving 
from class A to class Dc.  What changes are the 
means used to reduce risk.  In performance-driven 
missions (classes A and B) the project will generally 
spend money in order to maintain performance 
without reducing margins (which increases risk).  In 
cost-constrained missions (classes C and D) 
performance will generally be reduced in order to 
stay within budget or to maintain schedule:  
measurement requirements may be traded (up to a 
point), design life may be reduced, or both.  Again, 
margins are maintained and risk does not increase. 
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 Regarding lifetime, any project regardless of 
the classification of its mission will do whatever is 
necessary to eliminate infant mortality (failure in the 
initial months after launch).  As shown in Figure 2, 
mission lifetime after that, as specified by the mission 
class, is mostly determined by choice of parts and by 
the redundancy approach, as well as by the depth of 
testing. 
 
Figure 2:  Flight Mission Reliability Based on 
Historical Performance  (Personal communication 
with Robert Bitten, The Aerospace Corporation)  
The reliability of flight missions degrades slowly as a 
function of years of operation.  Design life in the 
chart is a proxy for mission class. 
4.  Introducing a New Classification Scheme 
In order to address the problems discussed above, we 
introduce a new mission classification scheme based 
on four parameters: 
1. Direct heritage; 
2. Flexibility of requirements; 
3. Design lifetime; 
4. Budget rigidity. 
4.1 Direct heritage 
 The degree to which an instrument or 
spacecraft is derived from prior instruments or 
spacecraft. This parameter is related (inversely) to the 
amount of technology development needed for the 
mission. 
4.2 Flexibility of requirements 
 The degree to which requirements can be 
relaxed to stay within budget and schedule,without 
compromising the value of the mission. There is also 
a programmatic aspect to this parameter, having to do 
with timeliness (does the mission have to launch by a 
specific time, for example to replace a failing existing 
capability, or to measure a transient phenomenon). 
     4.3 Design lifetime 
 The minimum length of time that the 
mission must operate in order for it to be worth 
doing. While for any mission the project will 
naturally reduce or eliminate infant mortality, in 
some cases measurements need only be taken for one 
or two; in other cases up to five years are required to 
collect the necessary data; in the case of strategic 
missions of great cost and complexity, or that provide 
data of national importance (weather data for 
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example) a lifetime of more than five years may be 
required. 
4.4  Budget rigidity 
 This parameter describes whether additional 
funding ($) may be made available at various stages 
of the mission development in order to meet 
measurement performance requirements, or to meet 
programmatic cost and schedule requirements.  The 
$ may change depending on how long the mission 
has been in development and on the amount of sunk 
resource, as well as on the relative importance of the 
mission.  In the case of strategic missions, relatively 
unconstrained additional funding may be made 
available in the initial phases of development, while 
in the case of cost-capped missions (Discovery, Earth 
Venture, etc.) no funding that exceeds that initially 
specified is ever available.  
 For a Class D mission, there is no flexibility: 
there will be no additional dollars forthcoming, 
regardless of the progress made or the sunk 
investment.  However, for a Class C mission, there 
may be increased monetary investment and the 
amount of that increase is at least partially based 
upon the percentage of development that is complete.  
That is, for a Class C mission, the % dollars over 
baseline may increase during the middle of mission 
development.  But at some point, the over-run 
reaches a peak after which no additional over-run 
funding is forthcoming. Note that this classification 
applies to flight missions (including instruments), but 
not to balloon missions nor to sounding rocket 
missions.  A Class B mission must meet performance 
requirements, but the measurements are (relatively) 
straightforward and thereis some budgetary fexibility. 
Operational missions and most planetary missiona 
are Class B.  Class A missions perform exquisite 
measurements that require the development of new 
technology. Performance requirements must be met 
and there are few budgetary constraints. 
 Realizing that the process to classify a 
mission is often ambiguous and the result sometime 
debatable, we have developed Boolean expressions to 
determine mission class based on the four parameters 
discussed above (direct heritage; flexibility of 
requirements; design life; budget rigidity).   
IF $  heritage  reqts not flex  >5yr life → 
class A/B  
IF $  (heritage  reqts not flex)  (heritage  
2-5yr life) → class C 
IF $  reqts not flex)  (heritage   <1yr life) 
 (heritage  1-2yr life) → class D 
$ Percentage cost overrun 
which is acceptable 
Heritage Measurements have been 
demonstrated 
Reqs not flex When requirements (either 
technical or schedule) 
cannot be relaxed  
Life The minimum length of 
time that the mission must 
operate in order for it to be 
worth doing 
Table 1:  Definitions of the Boolean terms. 
 Let us now go through the logic with a few 
examples. 
 
 A mission is said to be class A if three 
criteria are met:  first, the measurements have no 
direct heritage.  Second, the requirements must be 
met (due to the exquisite nature of the measurements) 
and cannot be traded against cost and schedule.  
Third, the mission needs to last for more than five 
years. 
 
This results in a design-to-performance approach, 
with relatively unconstrained budget at least in the 
initial phases. 
 
 Example:  The James Webb Space 
Telescope (JWST) because the measurements have 
no direct heritage and cannot be traded. 
 
 For a Class B missions the schedule is not 
flexible (because the mission is operational and of 
national importance, or because planetary launch 
constraints need to be met). The requirements must 
be met, but the measurements are straightforward. 
The design lifetime is five years or more. 
 
 Examples: The Joint Polar Satellite System 
(JPSS) and Landsat because they are missions of 
national importance (weather and environmental 
monitoring).  
 
 For a class C mission either the 
measurements have no direct heritage but the 
schedule is flexible, or the measurements are 
relatively straightforward but the schedule is not 
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flexible.  In either case the requirements are flexible 
and can be traded against cost and schedule.  The 
mission lifetime in this case is between two and five 
years. 
 
 This results in a soft design-to-cost approach 
where funds could be added to keep schedule, but not 
to keep performance. 
 
 Examples:  PACE, ICESat, because the 
requirements are flexible and can be traded against 
cost and schedule (even though, in the case of 
ICESat, they actually were not traded) and the 
mission needs to last up to five years. 
 
 For a class D mission the measurements are 
relatively straightforward, or there could be 
measurements of an experimental nature.  Both 
budget and schedule are typically capped, and 
therefore the performance requirements are flexible 
and can be traded.  The mission lifetime is usually 
between one and three years. 
 
 Examples:  NICER, CATS, Earth Venture.  
Both NICER and CATS are ISS attached payloads, 
with CATS being a technology demonstration which 
was only under “do no harm” ISS requirements (can 
be thought of as Class D minus).  In all three cases 
the budget is capped and the mission lifetime is up to 
three years. and Goddard developed a way to mitigate 
unnecessary requirements on Class D projects and 
same should be developed for Class B and C 
missions as well. 
 
 
Characteristic/Class for 
SMD 
A B C D 
NASA Significance High High Moderate Low 
Performance Requirements Must meet agreed 
to performance 
requirements  
Must meet agreed to 
performance 
requirements 
Performance 
requirements may 
be reduced or 
schedule slipped 
Performance 
requirements may be 
reduced  
Launch constraints Some Critical None Some 
New technology  Required Not required As Needed  As Needed 
Lifetime  5 yrs.   5 yrs.  2-5 yrs.  2 yr. 
JCL .8  .7 .7  .7 
Risk reduction risk minimized by 
applying budget 
resources 
risk minimized by 
applying budget 
resources 
risk minimized by 
reducing 
performance or 
slipping schedule 
risk minimized by 
reducing 
performance and 
lifetime 
Example  JWST  
WFIRST   
Landsat 9 
GOES  
JPSS  
TDRS  
TSIS  
MAVEN (schedule) 
O-REX (schedule) 
Restore L (schedule) 
MMS 
TESS 
ICON 
LUCY 
PACE 
GEDI 
NICER 
 
 
 5.  Conclusion 
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 We argue that risk is always minimized in 
any flight mission, and is therefore not useful as a 
classification criterion.  We then propose a new 
approach to the classification of NASA space flight 
missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the 
requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how 
long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.   
 We argue that risk does not change between 
classes.  What changes are the means available to 
reduce risk.  In performance-driven missions, the 
project will spend money in order to maintain 
performance without reducing margins.  In cost-
constrained missions, performance will be reduced in 
order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: 
measurement requirements may be traded, design life 
may be reduced, or both.  Thus, our proposed 
approach makes possible a clearer differentiation 
between classification levels and more effective 
guidance to program and project managers. 
 Mission classification at NASA is controlled 
by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(OSMA)via NPR 8705.4, which was last updated in 
2004.  We hope with this paper to start a fruitful 
discussion in the community on this new 
classification approach with a view towards updating 
the NPR to reflect these suggestions. 
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